The base model selector in the model creation workspace listed every
model from the global store, ignoring the per-model visibility (hidden)
flag. Models marked as not visible were correctly hidden from the chat
model selector but still appeared in the workspace 'Base Model (From)'
dropdown.
Filter out hidden models (info.meta.hidden) to match the chat selector
behavior, while still keeping a model visible if it is the currently
selected base, so editing a preset built on a now-hidden base does not
show a blank dropdown.
Fixes#25665https://claude.ai/code/session_01CUvzYN9DjvwTpNCT5QL33B
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
routers/openai.py and routers/ollama.py decorated get_all_models with
`@cached(key=lambda _, user: ...)`. In aiocache 0.12, `key=` is a STATIC
cache key: get_cache_key returns `self.key` verbatim (the lambda object)
without calling it, so every caller collides to ONE shared entry within
the TTL. The intended per-user namespacing never happened — one user's
permission-filtered model list could be served to another user (or an
anonymous caller) during the cache window.
The per-call hook is `key_builder=` (called as key_builder(func, *args,
**kwargs)). Switch both sites to key_builder with a (func, request,
user=None) signature so the key is built per call. user=None mirrors
ollama's optional-user signature and stays correct whether user is passed
positionally, as a kwarg, or omitted.
Verified offline: old form returns the same key object for distinct users
(collision); new form yields distinct openai_all_models_<id> /
ollama_all_models_<id> keys, and the unauthenticated base key when no user.
These two were the only @cached(key=lambda ...) sites in the backend.
The Ollama model upload and download handlers perform three stages
of sync file I/O on multi-GB model files inside async handlers:
1. Persist upload — file.file.read() + write() in a loop
2. SHA-256 hash — calculate_sha256() reads the file sequentially
3. Read for blob push — open().read() loads entire model into memory
All three stages block the event loop for the duration of the I/O.
For a 4GB model, each stage freezes the event loop for 10+ seconds
while every other user's request stalls.
Wrap each blocking stage in asyncio.to_thread() in both handlers:
- upload_model(): persist upload, calculate_sha256, blob read
- download_file_stream(): calculate_sha256, blob read
Benchmark (full pipeline: write + SHA-256 + read back, 3 trials):
- 200MB: max jitter 145ms → 1ms (145x improvement)
- 500MB: max jitter 1,026ms → 1ms (1,026x improvement)
File I/O is pure I/O — no GIL contention. asyncio.to_thread()
completely eliminates event loop blocking.
GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/{message_id}/thread authorized only the URL channel, but get_messages_by_parent_id() appended the thread parent (loaded by id) without checking it belonged to that channel, so a caller could read a message from a channel they cannot access by passing its id as the thread root. Require the parent to be in the requested channel before returning it, and reject a posted parent_id/reply_to_id that does not belong to the channel.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Wrap get_content_from_url() in asyncio.to_thread() inside
get_sources_from_items() to prevent sync requests.get() from blocking
the event loop when users attach URL sources to chat messages.
The same function was already properly wrapped at retrieval.py:1839.
- Wrap hashlib.sha256(contents).hexdigest() in asyncio.to_thread()
inside upload_file_handler() to prevent CPU-bound hashing from
blocking the event loop during file uploads (44ms/100MB, scales
linearly with file size).
A trailing space in the Open Terminal bearer token broke only the
interactive terminal: HTTP calls put the token in the Authorization
header, where the spec strips trailing whitespace, so the connection
test, file listing and tool calls all worked. The terminal WebSocket
can't set headers from the browser, so it sends the token inside a JSON
auth message that preserves the space verbatim, failing auth with
[Connection closed]. Normalize the key on save so whitespace never
enters storage, and trim it in the WebSocket auth message so existing
saved configs work without re-saving.
Fixes#25613
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Web search results stored as a vector collection were silently dropped
before retrieval when BYPASS_RETRIEVAL_ACCESS_CONTROL is False (the
default). The server-generated web_search file item carries a
'collection_name' but its 'web_search' type is not matched by any
explicit dispatch branch in get_sources_from_items, so it fell through
to the untrusted client-supplied collection_name branch and was ignored.
Add an explicit branch for type == 'web_search' items so the collection
is queried again. Access control is preserved: the collection still
passes through filter_accessible_collections, which already allowlists
web-search-* and bypasses only for admins.
Regression introduced when the retrieval access-control hardening gated
the bare collection_name fallback behind BYPASS_RETRIEVAL_ACCESS_CONTROL.
get_embedding_function runs at import time (main.py), so the empty-engine
+ no-model guard added in 55ca719b raised ValueError during startup and
bricked the instance: a blank embedding model set via the UI made the app
unbootable, with no way back into settings to undo it. Move the check into
the returned coroutine so construction always succeeds and the error only
fires when something actually embeds, surfacing as a clear request error
instead of the old cryptic 'NoneType has no attribute encode'.
Fixes#25634Fixes#25165
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Sign Out button on the Account Pending overlay only cleared the
local token and redirected to /auth, skipping the backend signout. This
left the OAuth/OIDC session alive at the IdP, so re-login bounced the
user straight back into pending and never re-fetched updated role/group
claims. Call userSignOut() and honor the returned redirect_url, matching
the sidebar logout flow.
Fixes#25644
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The file picker and Files modal only render filenames and metadata, but
searchFiles()/getFiles() never passed content=false, so the backend
serialized data.content (full extracted text) of every file into each
response. On instances with many large documents this turns a metadata
list into tens of MB per request, re-issued on every picker keystroke.
The backend already supports content=false on GET /files/ and
GET /files/search; this just makes the list/search callers opt out of the
payload by default. The param stays overridable for callers that need it.
Fixes#25741
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A chat created in place (new chat -> first message) keeps chatIdProp
undefined because the URL is swapped via history.replaceState without a
remount, so none of the chatIdProp-gated updateLastReadAt paths fire and
the chat is never persisted with a last_read_at. Starting another new
chat via initNewChat reset $chatId without marking the outgoing chat
read, so on refresh updated_at > last_read_at (NULL) and the chat shows
as unread in the sidebar.
Mark the outgoing chat read in initNewChat, mirroring navigateHandler.
Fixes#25108
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
validate_url() calls socket.getaddrinfo() for SSRF protection, which
blocks the event loop for 100-700ms per DNS lookup. This affects:
- Image generation (get_image_data) — every external image URL
- Image editing (load_url_image) — every external image URL
- OAuth profile pictures (_process_picture_url) — every login
- Webhook delivery (post_webhook) — every notification
- Image base64 conversion (get_image_base64_from_url) — chat images
Wrap all 5 async call sites in asyncio.to_thread() so DNS resolution
runs in the thread pool. The event loop remains free to serve other
requests during the lookup.
Benchmark (3 domains, 3 trials averaged):
- BEFORE: max jitter 479ms, 1 blocked ping per trial
- AFTER: max jitter 1ms, 0 blocked pings (324x improvement)
Co-authored-by: Tim Baek <tim@openwebui.com>
get_event_call() routed execute:python / execute:tool events to a client-supplied session_id after only checking the session was connected, not that it belonged to the requester. Verify the target session is owned by the requesting user (metadata user_id) before delivering, so a client cannot route code/tool execution into another user's session.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Azure TTS handler (_tts_azure) interpolated the user-supplied voice,
and the locale derived from it, into the SSML xml:lang and <voice name>
attributes without XML-escaping, while the text body was already escaped
(2e75c6dbd). Escape both attributes too, so every user-derived value in
the SSML document is consistently encoded.
Co-authored-by: alanturing881 <alanturing881@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(calendar): add repeat/recurrence dropdown to event modal
* fix(calendar): anchor recurring event expansion to event start date
The expand_recurring_event() utility used the view range start as dtstart,
causing FREQ=WEEKLY events to land on the wrong day of the week. Use the
event's original start date instead so recurrence patterns stay correct.
The web-ingest probe in get_content_from_url validated the URL at resolve
time (validate_url) but then fetched with a bare requests.get, which
re-resolves the hostname at connect time. An attacker-controlled name
server can answer with a public IP during validation and an internal IP
at connect, reaching cloud metadata / loopback / internal services (blind
always; binary content-types are read back to the caller). The
connection-layer guard (#24759) that closes this for the SafeWebBaseLoader
path was never mounted on this probe.
Route the probe through the same _SSRFSafeAdapter the loader uses, so the
resolution that feeds the TCP connect is re-validated against the
global-IP check.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
