* fix: prevent mass-assignment user_id spoofing in POST /api/v1/evaluations/feedback
Two independent gaps in backend/open_webui/models/feedbacks.py let an
authenticated caller forge the `user_id` (and `id`, `version`) on a new
feedback record submitted to POST /api/v1/evaluations/feedback:
1. `FeedbackForm` declared `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow')`,
so Pydantic preserved any extra fields supplied in the request body —
including `user_id`, `id`, `version`. The form is the public input
boundary for the endpoint and should not accept unknown fields.
2. In `insert_new_feedback`, the dict literal placed
`**form_data.model_dump()` AFTER `'id': id`, `'user_id': user_id`,
`'version': 0`. Python dict-literal duplicate-key resolution is
last-wins, so any of those fields present in `form_data` overwrote
the server-derived values.
Combined effect: a regular user could POST a feedback record with an
arbitrary `user_id`, attributing the rating to any other user. The Elo
leaderboard at backend/open_webui/routers/evaluations.py computes model
rankings from these records, and the admin export
(GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/export) and admin list
(GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/all) display the spoofed attribution.
Two fixes, defense-in-depth:
- FeedbackForm: switch `extra='allow'` to `extra='ignore'` so Pydantic
drops unknown fields at parse time. Sub-models (RatingData / MetaData /
SnapshotData) intentionally keep `extra='allow'` because their contents
are deliberately schema-flexible — the spoofing surface was the form,
not the sub-payloads.
- insert_new_feedback: spread `form_data.model_dump()` first, then
overlay server-controlled fields (`id`, `user_id`, `version`,
`created_at`, `updated_at`) so the explicit keys win on duplicate-key
resolution regardless of what reaches the function. Matches the secure
pattern already used in backend/open_webui/models/functions.py:120.
Reported by yantongggg in GHSA-rjmp-vjf2-qf4g. Same root-cause class as
the prior published GHSA-hr43-rjmr-7wmm (folder mass-assignment, fixed
in v0.9.0); that fix did not generalize across the codebase, this fix
closes the feedback variant.
Co-authored-by: yantongggg <yantongggg@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: trim comments
---------
Co-authored-by: yantongggg <yantongggg@users.noreply.github.com>
Non-admin GET /api/v1/prompts/tags went through get_prompts_by_user_id,
which loaded every active prompt with its full content/data/meta plus
owner records and all access grants, then ran one has_access query per
prompt that wasn't owned by the caller - all so the endpoint could
collapse the result to a sorted tag list. With 600 prompts this took
several seconds while the admin path (a single SELECT) returned in <1s.
Add Prompts.get_tags_by_user_id which selects only the tags column and
applies the same EXISTS-based access filter used by /list. Also tighten
the admin get_tags to project just the tags column instead of full rows.
The endpoint is now one DB query (plus one for groups), no row hydration,
no N+1.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
get_prompts_by_user_id used to fetch every active prompt (with users +
all access grants), then call AccessGrants.has_access() once per prompt
that the user did not own. With 600+ prompts this issued ~600 extra
round-trips per request and explained the multi-second delay reported in
the GET /api/v1/prompts and /api/v1/prompts/tags endpoints for non-admin
users.
Push the access check into a single SQL query via the existing
AccessGrants.has_permission_filter (EXISTS subquery), so only accessible
rows come back from the DB. Users and access grants for the surviving
rows are still batch-fetched, no N+1 anywhere on this path.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The chat table has no computed columns (no DEFAULT, SERIAL/IDENTITY,
or TRIGGER that populate server-side values on UPDATE), and every
column modified by update_chat_by_id is set explicitly from Python
values earlier in the function. db.refresh therefore issues a SELECT
that replaces those just-written Python values with the round-tripped
database representation of the same values, which is a no-op for
functional purposes but pulls the entire chat.chat JSON blob back over
the network and through the driver's JSON decoder.
On large, active chats where chat.chat can reach tens of megabytes,
skipping the refresh measurably reduces latency and eliminates one
~JSON-sized transient allocation per write.
Avoid loading the full Chat row (including the potentially large `chat`
JSON column) just to read tag IDs from `meta.tags`. Issue a narrow
SELECT on `Chat.meta` instead, which is much cheaper for chats with
large message histories.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Convert chat_message_file_ids from list to set so the membership test
in the comprehension is O(1) instead of O(m), turning the dedupe from
O(n*m) into O(n+m). Also replace the redundant set([...]) with a set
comprehension.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01Le3NnqNhcgaJvFrDZGqmwe
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: drop extra='allow' on FolderForm and FolderUpdateForm
These request models were configured to accept arbitrary extra fields,
which were then merged into the folder row via form_data.model_dump().
In insert_new_folder the server-assigned user_id is placed before the
form spread, so a client-supplied user_id in the request body would
override it and the folder would be persisted against another account.
Strictly typed inputs are the correct shape for these endpoints — the
client has no legitimate reason to send fields beyond the declared
ones, and dropping extra='allow' closes the mass-assignment sink at
the validation layer instead of relying on every callsite to merge
fields in the right order.
* fix: reject unknown fields on FolderForm and FolderUpdateForm
Address review feedback: dropping extra='allow' fell back to Pydantic
v2's default extra='ignore', which only silently drops unknown fields
instead of rejecting them. The intent for these request models is a
strict input contract — fail fast when a client sends anything the
server does not expect — so explicitly set extra='forbid'. This also
makes the hardening visible in the form definition rather than implicit
in the default.
is_user_channel_member and is_user_channel_manager did not filter on is_active, allowing deactivated members to retain read/write access to group channels via direct API calls.
