This includes:
- Full refactoring of the command palette
- Remove command transformation logic for dynamic
commands
- Replace note, notebook & tag specific commands
with a simple menu item -> command conversion logic
- Cached filtering (with notes, notebooks etc.
refetching on sync)
- Add support for fuzzy searching on command group
- Modernize UI to look more like a command palette and less like a dialog
- add ability to wrap matching text in prefix/suffix
- return match score for further sorting etc.
- fetch everything eagerly (instead of iterating on matches) for perf
- add support for ignoring fields (i.e. ignore id field)
* web: wrap & remove auto-resize of note title
* wrap note title if it overflows
* remove auto-resizing of note title based on its length
Signed-off-by: 01zulfi <85733202+01zulfi@users.noreply.github.com>
* web: remove newlines in title textarea
---------
Co-authored-by: Abdullah Atta <abdullahatta@streetwriters.co>
The current search algorithm while accumulating text assumes that the
text nodes are always followed by a paragraph node with endPos ==
textNode.endPos + 1. This is not true for complex text elements like
tables where the endPos can be higher. Thus the start,end offsets of
TextNodesWithPosition start getting off and results in incorrectly
highlighted search results.
To fix this, simplify the TextNodesWithPosition to only hold start
position and offset since startPos is always correct. We can calculate
the end position on the fly by simply adding text length to startPos.
Issue #7431
Signed-off-by: Waqar Ahmed <waqar.17a@gmail.com>
This fixes a potential security vulnerability where pasting unknown content into the editor could create an RCE risk.
This PR fixes two issues:
1. Potential RCE when pasting/inserting an `iframe` containing a `javascript` link.
2. Potential RCE when pasting/inserting an `svg` containing JavaScript (why do SVGs allow JS in the first place?).
Mitigations include disallowing all execution of JS inside an SVG by rendering it in a sandboxed `iframe`. While we cannot disallow JS execution in embeds (that would break all embeds like YouTube videos), we have disallowed access to the parent window to all `iframe`s, again, by using a sandboxed `iframe` and by disallowing embedding of `javascript:` links.
To be clear, both of these issues can only be triggered when pasting/importing untrusted content (which you shouldn't be doing anyway).
**These cannot be used to steal or access your notes or any other data. They could be used to access what's shown in the window or do automated clicks etc. but since everything is stored and access from an encrypted SQLite database, your data would be 100% safe and isolated from such an attack.**
