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chore(security): drop advisory identifiers from code comments

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Explanations kept unchanged; only the IDs are removed.

Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
This commit is contained in:
Manish Gupta
2026-08-07 15:59:05 +05:30
parent b9a01fdaef
commit 880960390a
2 changed files with 6 additions and 9 deletions
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11
apps/api/plane/api/views/issue.py
View File

@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ class IssueListCreateAPIEndpoint(BaseAPIView):
# Reject any field not in the allowlist before it reaches .order_by(). # Reject any field not in the allowlist before it reaches .order_by().
# An unrecognised value is replaced with the safe default, preventing # An unrecognised value is replaced with the safe default, preventing
# ORM order_by injection via relational traversal (GHSA-p885-6jpg-cr2p). # ORM order_by injection via relational traversal.
order_by_param = sanitize_order_by( order_by_param = sanitize_order_by(
request.GET.get("order_by", "-created_at"), request.GET.get("order_by", "-created_at"),
ISSUE_ORDER_BY_ALLOWLIST, ISSUE_ORDER_BY_ALLOWLIST,
@@ -1605,8 +1605,7 @@ class IssueCommentDetailAPIEndpoint(BaseAPIView):
issue_comment = IssueComment.objects.get(workspace__slug=slug, project_id=project_id, issue_id=issue_id, pk=pk) issue_comment = IssueComment.objects.get(workspace__slug=slug, project_id=project_id, issue_id=issue_id, pk=pk)
# Only the comment author or a project admin may modify a comment. # Only the comment author or a project admin may modify a comment.
# ProjectLitePermission alone lets any active member (incl. Guest) reach # ProjectLitePermission alone lets any active member (incl. Guest) reach
# here, so enforce the same author/admin rule the app applies # here, so enforce the same author/admin rule the app applies.
# (GHSA-h4p4-mwfg-qh82).
if issue_comment.created_by_id != request.user.id and not ProjectMember.objects.filter( if issue_comment.created_by_id != request.user.id and not ProjectMember.objects.filter(
project_id=project_id, member_id=request.user.id, role=ROLE.ADMIN.value, is_active=True project_id=project_id, member_id=request.user.id, role=ROLE.ADMIN.value, is_active=True
).exists(): ).exists():
@@ -1684,8 +1683,7 @@ class IssueCommentDetailAPIEndpoint(BaseAPIView):
Records deletion activity for audit purposes. Records deletion activity for audit purposes.
""" """
issue_comment = IssueComment.objects.get(workspace__slug=slug, project_id=project_id, issue_id=issue_id, pk=pk) issue_comment = IssueComment.objects.get(workspace__slug=slug, project_id=project_id, issue_id=issue_id, pk=pk)
# Only the comment author or a project admin may delete a comment # Only the comment author or a project admin may delete a comment.
# (GHSA-h4p4-mwfg-qh82).
if issue_comment.created_by_id != request.user.id and not ProjectMember.objects.filter( if issue_comment.created_by_id != request.user.id and not ProjectMember.objects.filter(
project_id=project_id, member_id=request.user.id, role=ROLE.ADMIN.value, is_active=True project_id=project_id, member_id=request.user.id, role=ROLE.ADMIN.value, is_active=True
).exists(): ).exists():
@@ -2028,8 +2026,7 @@ class IssueAttachmentListCreateAPIEndpoint(BaseAPIView):
# This endpoint has no permission_classes beyond IsAuthenticated, and API # This endpoint has no permission_classes beyond IsAuthenticated, and API
# tokens authenticate globally (not workspace-scoped), so enforce project # tokens authenticate globally (not workspace-scoped), so enforce project
# membership on the issue the same way post() does — otherwise any token # membership on the issue the same way post() does — otherwise any token
# holder could read any issue's attachment metadata cross-tenant # holder could read any issue's attachment metadata cross-tenant.
# (GHSA-xvc5-m5jf-gvpj).
issue = Issue.objects.get(pk=issue_id, workspace__slug=slug, project_id=project_id) issue = Issue.objects.get(pk=issue_id, workspace__slug=slug, project_id=project_id)
if not user_has_issue_permission( if not user_has_issue_permission(
request.user.id, request.user.id,

4
apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_external_api_issue_authz.py
View File

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
Regression coverage for: Regression coverage for:
* GHSA-h4p4-mwfg-qh82 — ``IssueCommentDetailAPIEndpoint`` (``ProjectLitePermission``, * comment tamper — ``IssueCommentDetailAPIEndpoint`` (``ProjectLitePermission``,
any active member) edited/deleted comments by id with no author/admin check, so any active member) edited/deleted comments by id with no author/admin check, so
a Guest could tamper with anyone's comments. a Guest could tamper with anyone's comments.
* GHSA-xvc5-m5jf-gvpj — ``IssueAttachmentListCreateAPIEndpoint.get`` had no * attachment leak — ``IssueAttachmentListCreateAPIEndpoint.get`` had no
``permission_classes`` (bare ``IsAuthenticated``) and no membership check, so any ``permission_classes`` (bare ``IsAuthenticated``) and no membership check, so any
API-token holder could list any issue's attachment metadata cross-tenant. API-token holder could list any issue's attachment metadata cross-tenant.