diff --git a/apps/api/plane/bgtasks/copy_s3_object.py b/apps/api/plane/bgtasks/copy_s3_object.py index 742966a6fb..d2ffbe2856 100644 --- a/apps/api/plane/bgtasks/copy_s3_object.py +++ b/apps/api/plane/bgtasks/copy_s3_object.py @@ -77,7 +77,19 @@ def sync_with_external_service(entity_name, description_html): url = normalize_url_path(f"{live_url}/convert-document/") - response = requests.post(url, json=data, headers=None) + # The Live service authenticates this endpoint with a shared secret + # (GHSA-55gq-rf47-9pqx). Without the header the request is rejected as 401. + secret_key = settings.LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY + if not secret_key: + log_exception( + Exception( + "LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY is not configured; skipping document conversion " + "for duplication. Set it to the same value as the Live service." + ) + ) + return {} + + response = requests.post(url, json=data, headers={"live-server-secret-key": secret_key}) if response.status_code == 200: return response.json() except requests.RequestException as e: diff --git a/apps/api/plane/settings/common.py b/apps/api/plane/settings/common.py index 25a212e763..a85efc79ed 100644 --- a/apps/api/plane/settings/common.py +++ b/apps/api/plane/settings/common.py @@ -418,6 +418,10 @@ LIVE_BASE_PATH = os.environ.get("LIVE_BASE_PATH", "/live/") LIVE_URL = urljoin(LIVE_BASE_URL, LIVE_BASE_PATH) if LIVE_BASE_URL else None +# Shared secret for server-to-server calls into the Live service. Must match the +# Live container's LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY. +LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get("LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY") + # WEB URL WEB_URL = os.environ.get("WEB_URL") diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/bg_tasks/test_copy_s3_object_auth.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/bg_tasks/test_copy_s3_object_auth.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ab449a3ac1 --- /dev/null +++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/bg_tasks/test_copy_s3_object_auth.py @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only +# See the LICENSE file for details. + +""" +Authentication of the API -> Live `/convert-document/` call (GHSA-55gq-rf47-9pqx). + +The Live service previously served `/convert-document/` to anyone who could reach +it (`requireSecretKey` was defined but never applied to a controller). Now that the +endpoint is gated on the `live-server-secret-key` header, this background task is +the one caller that has to present it — so the header must actually be sent, and a +missing key must fail loudly rather than firing a request that 401s. + +These are pure unit tests: no database, no network. +""" + +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +from django.test import override_settings + +from plane.bgtasks.copy_s3_object import sync_with_external_service + +LIVE_URL = "http://live:3000/live/" +SECRET = "unit-test-live-secret" + + +@override_settings(LIVE_URL=LIVE_URL, LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY=SECRET) +def test_sends_secret_key_header(): + """The shared secret must travel on the request, or Live returns 401.""" + response = MagicMock(status_code=200) + response.json.return_value = {"description_json": {}, "description_binary": "AA=="} + + with patch("plane.bgtasks.copy_s3_object.requests.post", return_value=response) as mock_post: + result = sync_with_external_service("PAGE", "

hello

") + + assert result == {"description_json": {}, "description_binary": "AA=="} + mock_post.assert_called_once() + + headers = mock_post.call_args.kwargs["headers"] + assert headers == {"live-server-secret-key": SECRET} + + +@override_settings(LIVE_URL=LIVE_URL, LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY=None) +def test_missing_secret_key_skips_request(): + """ + With no key configured the call could only ever 401, so it is not attempted. + Returning {} leaves `description_binary` untouched upstream (the caller guards + on `if external_data:`), which degrades duplication rather than corrupting it. + """ + with ( + patch("plane.bgtasks.copy_s3_object.requests.post") as mock_post, + patch("plane.bgtasks.copy_s3_object.log_exception") as mock_log, + ): + result = sync_with_external_service("PAGE", "

hello

") + + assert result == {} + mock_post.assert_not_called() + # The misconfiguration must be surfaced, not swallowed silently. + mock_log.assert_called_once() + + +@override_settings(LIVE_URL=LIVE_URL, LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY="") +def test_empty_secret_key_treated_as_missing(): + """An empty string is a misconfiguration, not a valid credential.""" + with ( + patch("plane.bgtasks.copy_s3_object.requests.post") as mock_post, + patch("plane.bgtasks.copy_s3_object.log_exception"), + ): + result = sync_with_external_service("PAGE", "

hello

") + + assert result == {} + mock_post.assert_not_called() + + +@override_settings(LIVE_URL=None, LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY=SECRET) +def test_no_live_url_short_circuits(): + """Deployments without a Live service must not attempt the call at all.""" + with patch("plane.bgtasks.copy_s3_object.requests.post") as mock_post: + result = sync_with_external_service("PAGE", "

hello

") + + assert result == {} + mock_post.assert_not_called() + + +@override_settings(LIVE_URL=LIVE_URL, LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY=SECRET) +def test_non_200_returns_empty_dict(): + """A rejected call (e.g. a stale key on one side) must not raise.""" + with patch("plane.bgtasks.copy_s3_object.requests.post", return_value=MagicMock(status_code=401)): + result = sync_with_external_service("PAGE", "

hello

") + + assert result == {} + + +@override_settings(LIVE_URL=LIVE_URL, LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY=SECRET) +def test_variant_depends_on_entity_name(): + """Guard the existing contract while changing the auth around it.""" + response = MagicMock(status_code=200) + response.json.return_value = {} + + with patch("plane.bgtasks.copy_s3_object.requests.post", return_value=response) as mock_post: + sync_with_external_service("PAGE", "

x

") + assert mock_post.call_args.kwargs["json"]["variant"] == "rich" + + sync_with_external_service("ISSUE", "

x

") + assert mock_post.call_args.kwargs["json"]["variant"] == "document" diff --git a/apps/live/src/controllers/document.controller.ts b/apps/live/src/controllers/document.controller.ts index 3a0282f90d..ed607cefdc 100644 --- a/apps/live/src/controllers/document.controller.ts +++ b/apps/live/src/controllers/document.controller.ts @@ -7,10 +7,11 @@ import type { Request, Response } from "express"; import { z } from "zod"; // helpers -import { Controller, Post } from "@plane/decorators"; +import { Controller, Middleware, Post } from "@plane/decorators"; import { convertHTMLDocumentToAllFormats } from "@plane/editor"; // logger import { logger } from "@plane/logger"; +import { requireSecretKey } from "@/lib/auth-middleware"; import type { TConvertDocumentRequestBody } from "@/types"; // Define the schema with more robust validation @@ -25,7 +26,15 @@ const convertDocumentSchema = z.object({ @Controller("/convert-document") export class DocumentController { + /** + * Server-to-server only: the sole caller is the API's `copy_s3_object` background + * task (page / work-item duplication). It was previously reachable unauthenticated + * by anyone who could hit the Live service, which made an expensive HTML -> Y.js + * conversion available as free compute to the internet (GHSA-55gq-rf47-9pqx, + * CWE-306). Callers must now present `live-server-secret-key`. + */ @Post("/") + @Middleware(requireSecretKey) async convertDocument(req: Request, res: Response) { try { // Validate request body diff --git a/apps/live/src/lib/pdf/node-renderers.tsx b/apps/live/src/lib/pdf/node-renderers.tsx index 003d21f552..c08daeb22c 100644 --- a/apps/live/src/lib/pdf/node-renderers.tsx +++ b/apps/live/src/lib/pdf/node-renderers.tsx @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { Image, Link, Text, View } from "@react-pdf/renderer"; import type { Style } from "@react-pdf/types"; import type { ReactElement } from "react"; import { CORE_EXTENSIONS } from "@plane/editor"; +import { isSafeImageSrc } from "@/lib/url-security"; import { BACKGROUND_COLORS, EDITOR_BACKGROUND_COLORS, resolveColorForPdf, TEXT_COLORS } from "./colors"; import { CheckIcon, ClipboardIcon, DocumentIcon, GlobeIcon, LightbulbIcon, LinkIcon } from "./icons"; import { applyMarks } from "./mark-renderers"; @@ -272,6 +273,18 @@ export const nodeRenderers: NodeRendererRegistry = { ? { alignItems: "flex-end" as const } : { alignItems: "flex-start" as const }; + // SSRF guard (GHSA-55gq-rf47-9pqx). `src` comes from page content, and + // @react-pdf/image will fetch() any URL with a host — including internal + // Docker service names — or fs.readFile() a bare path. Anything we are not + // willing to fetch renders as a placeholder instead. + if (!isSafeImageSrc(src)) { + return ( + + [Image unavailable] + + ); + } + return ( [Image: {assetId.slice(0, 8)}...] diff --git a/apps/live/src/lib/url-security.ts b/apps/live/src/lib/url-security.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7f3f58ee0e --- /dev/null +++ b/apps/live/src/lib/url-security.ts @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/** + * Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only + * See the LICENSE file for details. + */ + +import net from "node:net"; + +/** + * SSRF guards for URLs that the Live service may cause to be fetched. + * + * Context (GHSA-55gq-rf47-9pqx): the PDF exporter renders TipTap `image` nodes by + * handing `node.attrs.src` straight to `@react-pdf/image`, which calls `fetch()` on + * anything with a host. Because the Live container shares a Docker network with the + * API, database, Redis, RabbitMQ and MinIO, an unvalidated `src` turns PDF export + * into a request forgery primitive against internal-only services. + * + * A prefix check such as `src.startsWith("http")` does NOT close this: the payloads + * that matter — `http://api:8000/`, `http://plane-minio:9000/` — all start with + * "http". The scheme is irrelevant; the *destination* is what has to be judged. + */ + +/** Schemes we are willing to hand to the PDF image pipeline. */ +const ALLOWED_SCHEMES = new Set(["http:", "https:", "data:"]); + +/** + * Hostname suffixes that only ever resolve inside a private network. + * Compared against the lowercased hostname, with a leading dot to avoid + * matching a public registrable domain that merely ends in these letters. + */ +const BLOCKED_HOST_SUFFIXES = [".local", ".localhost", ".internal", ".home.arpa", ".lan"]; + +/** Bare hostnames that need no DNS to be dangerous. */ +const BLOCKED_HOST_EXACT = new Set(["localhost", "metadata", "metadata.google.internal"]); + +/** + * Returns true when an IPv4 literal falls in a range that must never be fetched. + * Ranges follow IANA special-purpose registries rather than a hand-rolled + * "private IP" list, so CGNAT and benchmarking space are covered too. + */ +const isBlockedIPv4 = (ip: string): boolean => { + const parts = ip.split(".").map((p) => Number(p)); + if (parts.length !== 4 || parts.some((p) => !Number.isInteger(p) || p < 0 || p > 255)) { + // Not a canonical dotted quad — callers treat unparseable hosts as unsafe. + return true; + } + const [a, b] = parts as [number, number, number, number]; + + if (a === 0) return true; // 0.0.0.0/8 "this host on this network" + if (a === 10) return true; // 10.0.0.0/8 private + if (a === 127) return true; // 127.0.0.0/8 loopback + if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true; // 100.64.0.0/10 CGNAT + if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true; // 169.254.0.0/16 link-local (incl. 169.254.169.254 metadata) + if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true; // 172.16.0.0/12 private + if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true; // 192.168.0.0/16 private + if (a === 192 && b === 0) return true; // 192.0.0.0/24 + 192.0.2.0/24 (IETF protocol / TEST-NET-1) + if (a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19)) return true; // 198.18.0.0/15 benchmarking + if (a === 198 && b === 51) return true; // 198.51.100.0/24 TEST-NET-2 + if (a === 203 && b === 0) return true; // 203.0.113.0/24 TEST-NET-3 + if (a >= 224) return true; // 224.0.0.0/4 multicast, 240.0.0.0/4 reserved, 255.255.255.255 + + return false; +}; + +/** Returns true when an IPv6 literal must never be fetched. */ +const isBlockedIPv6 = (ip: string): boolean => { + const addr = ip.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, ""); + + // IPv4-mapped (::ffff:127.0.0.1) and IPv4-compatible forms: judge the embedded v4. + const mapped = addr.match(/^(?:::ffff:|::)((?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3})$/); + if (mapped?.[1]) return isBlockedIPv4(mapped[1]); + + if (addr === "::" || addr === "::1") return true; // unspecified / loopback + if (addr.startsWith("fe8") || addr.startsWith("fe9") || addr.startsWith("fea") || addr.startsWith("feb")) return true; // fe80::/10 link-local + // fec0::/10 deprecated site-local. Kept in step with the Python guard's + // _BLOCKED_NETWORKS (apps/api/plane/utils/ip_address.py) — the two lists must not + // drift, or one service will block a range the other happily fetches. + if (addr.startsWith("fec") || addr.startsWith("fed") || addr.startsWith("fee") || addr.startsWith("fef")) return true; + if (addr.startsWith("fc") || addr.startsWith("fd")) return true; // fc00::/7 unique local + if (addr.startsWith("ff")) return true; // ff00::/8 multicast + if (addr.startsWith("64:ff9b:")) return true; // 64:ff9b::/96 + 64:ff9b:1::/48 NAT64 + if (addr.startsWith("2002:")) return true; // 6to4 — can wrap a private v4 + if (/^2001:(0{1,4})?:/.test(addr)) return true; // 2001::/32 Teredo + if (addr.startsWith("::ffff:")) return true; // any other IPv4-mapped form + + return false; +}; + +/** + * Returns true when `host` is an IP literal pointing somewhere we refuse to fetch, + * or a numeric/obfuscated host form that is not a canonical address at all. + * + * Obfuscated encodings (`0x7f000001`, `2130706433`, `127.1`) are rejected outright: + * some HTTP clients expand them to loopback, none of them are legitimate image + * hosts, and normalising every variant is a losing game. + */ +export const isBlockedHostLiteral = (host: string): boolean => { + const bare = host.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, ""); + + const ipVersion = net.isIP(bare); + if (ipVersion === 4) return isBlockedIPv4(bare); + if (ipVersion === 6) return isBlockedIPv6(bare); + + // Hex (0x…), octal-ish, decimal, or short-form dotted numbers — never a real host. + if (/^0x[0-9a-f]+$/i.test(bare)) return true; + if (/^[0-9]+$/.test(bare)) return true; + if (/^[0-9.]+$/.test(bare)) return true; + + return false; +}; + +/** + * Returns true when a hostname is safe enough to hand to the image fetcher. + * + * Single-label hostnames are refused because that is exactly the shape of a Docker + * Compose service name — `api`, `web`, `plane-db`, `plane-redis`, `plane-minio` — + * which is the primary escalation path in this advisory. Public image hosts always + * carry a dot. + */ +const isAllowedHostname = (hostname: string): boolean => { + const host = hostname.toLowerCase(); + + if (!host) return false; + if (BLOCKED_HOST_EXACT.has(host)) return false; + if (BLOCKED_HOST_SUFFIXES.some((suffix) => host.endsWith(suffix))) return false; + if (isBlockedHostLiteral(host)) return false; + // No dot => single-label => container/service name on the internal network. + if (!host.includes(".")) return false; + // A trailing dot ("api.") sidesteps the check above without adding a real label. + if (host.endsWith(".")) return false; + + return true; +}; + +/** + * Decides whether a TipTap image `src` may be passed to the PDF image pipeline. + * + * `data:` URIs are allowed because the asset pipeline deliberately pre-fetches + * images server-side and inlines them as `data:image/jpeg;base64,…`; those never + * touch the network again at render time. + * + * NOTE ON DNS REBINDING: for an `http(s)` host that clears these checks we cannot + * pin the resolved address here — the renderer is synchronous and the actual + * `fetch()` happens inside `@react-pdf/image`, out of our reach. A hostname under + * attacker control that resolves to a blocked address therefore remains a residual + * TOCTOU. Closing it properly means pre-fetching raw image nodes the way + * `imageComponent` already pre-fetches assets, then rendering only `data:` URIs. + * Tracked as follow-up to SECUR-245 — do not mistake this helper for a complete + * SSRF defence on the http(s) path. + */ +export const isSafeImageSrc = (src: string): boolean => { + if (!src) return false; + + const trimmed = src.trim(); + if (!trimmed) return false; + + // Reject control characters and whitespace, which URL parsers strip and + // which have historically been used to smuggle a scheme past naive checks. + // oxlint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- intentional: these are exactly what we reject + if (/[\u0000-\u0020\u007F]/.test(trimmed)) return false; + + let parsed: URL; + try { + parsed = new URL(trimmed); + } catch { + // Relative paths and bare filesystem paths land here. `@react-pdf/image` + // would hand those to fs.readFile(), so they are refused. + return false; + } + + if (!ALLOWED_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) return false; + + // data: carries its payload inline; there is no host to judge. + if (parsed.protocol === "data:") return trimmed.toLowerCase().startsWith("data:image/"); + + // Credentials in an image URL are never legitimate and can confuse host parsing. + if (parsed.username || parsed.password) return false; + + return isAllowedHostname(parsed.hostname); +}; diff --git a/apps/live/tests/lib/url-security.test.ts b/apps/live/tests/lib/url-security.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c41e238ebd --- /dev/null +++ b/apps/live/tests/lib/url-security.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +/** + * Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only + * See the LICENSE file for details. + */ + +import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; +import { isBlockedHostLiteral, isSafeImageSrc } from "@/lib/url-security"; + +describe("isSafeImageSrc — GHSA-55gq-rf47-9pqx", () => { + describe("advisory payloads: internal Docker service names", () => { + // The escalation path named in the advisory. Every one of these starts with + // "http", which is why the imageComponent-style startsWith("http") guard + // does not close this vulnerability. + it.each([ + "http://api:8000/api/workspaces/", + "http://plane-minio:9000/uploads/", + "http://plane-db:5432/", + "http://plane-redis:6379/", + "http://plane-mq:5672/", + "http://web:3000/", + "http://admin:3000/", + "http://space:3000/", + "http://live:3000/", + ])("rejects %s", (src) => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc(src)).toBe(false); + }); + + it("rejects a single-label host even over https", () => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc("https://api/")).toBe(false); + }); + + it("rejects a trailing-dot host that would otherwise look multi-label", () => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc("http://api./")).toBe(false); + }); + }); + + describe("cloud metadata and loopback", () => { + it.each([ + "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", + "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/", + "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/", + "http://localhost:8000/", + "http://127.0.0.1:8000/", + "http://127.1.2.3/", + "http://[::1]/", + "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/", + ])("rejects %s", (src) => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc(src)).toBe(false); + }); + }); + + describe("private, CGNAT, link-local and reserved ranges", () => { + it.each([ + "http://10.0.0.5/", + "http://172.16.0.1/", + "http://172.31.255.254/", + "http://192.168.1.1/", + "http://100.64.0.1/", // CGNAT — missed by naive "private IP" lists + "http://100.127.255.255/", + "http://0.0.0.0/", + "http://224.0.0.1/", // multicast + "http://255.255.255.255/", + "http://198.18.0.1/", // benchmarking + "http://[fd00::1]/", // IPv6 unique local + "http://[fe80::1]/", // IPv6 link-local + "http://[ff02::1]/", // IPv6 multicast + "http://[fec0::1]/", // IPv6 deprecated site-local + "http://[2002:7f00:1::]/", // 6to4 wrapping 127.0.0.1 + "http://[2001::1]/", // Teredo + "http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/", // NAT64 wrapping 127.0.0.1 + "http://[64:ff9b:1::1]/", // NAT64 local-use prefix + ])("rejects %s", (src) => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc(src)).toBe(false); + }); + + it("allows a public IP just outside a blocked range", () => { + // 100.63.x is public; the CGNAT block starts at 100.64. + expect(isSafeImageSrc("http://100.63.0.1/")).toBe(true); + // 172.32.x is public; the private block ends at 172.31. + expect(isSafeImageSrc("http://172.32.0.1/")).toBe(true); + }); + }); + + describe("obfuscated address encodings", () => { + // Not canonical addresses, but several HTTP clients expand them to loopback. + it.each([ + "http://2130706433/", // decimal 127.0.0.1 + "http://0x7f000001/", // hex 127.0.0.1 + "http://127.1/", // short-form 127.0.0.1 + "http://0/", // shorthand for 0.0.0.0 + ])("rejects %s", (src) => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc(src)).toBe(false); + }); + }); + + describe("scheme handling", () => { + it.each([ + "file:///etc/passwd", + "ftp://example.com/x.png", + "gopher://example.com/", + "javascript:alert(1)", + "vbscript:msgbox(1)", + "blob:https://example.com/abc", + ])("rejects %s", (src) => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc(src)).toBe(false); + }); + + it("rejects bare filesystem paths that would reach fs.readFile", () => { + // The advisory's secondary local-file-read finding. + expect(isSafeImageSrc("/etc/passwd")).toBe(false); + expect(isSafeImageSrc("./relative.png")).toBe(false); + expect(isSafeImageSrc("../../etc/hosts")).toBe(false); + }); + + it("allows image data URIs (the asset pipeline's own output)", () => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc("")).toBe(true); + expect(isSafeImageSrc("")).toBe(true); + }); + + it("rejects non-image data URIs", () => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc("data:text/html,")).toBe(false); + expect(isSafeImageSrc("data:application/javascript,alert(1)")).toBe(false); + }); + }); + + describe("whitespace and control-character smuggling", () => { + // The same class of bypass as GHSA-v2vv-7wq3-8w2j: URL parsers strip these, + // so a check performed before stripping can be walked straight past. + it.each([ + "\thttp://api:8000/", + "\nhttp://api:8000/", + "\rhttp://api:8000/", + " http://127.0.0.1/", + "http://api\t:8000/", + "\u0000http://api:8000/", + "\u00A0http://api:8000/", // non-breaking space + "\uFEFFhttp://api:8000/", // BOM + ])("rejects %j", (src) => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc(src)).toBe(false); + }); + }); + + describe("embedded credentials", () => { + it("rejects URLs carrying credentials", () => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc("http://user:pass@images.example.com/a.png")).toBe(false); + // Credentials can also be used to make the real host hard to read. + expect(isSafeImageSrc("http://images.example.com@127.0.0.1/a.png")).toBe(false); + }); + }); + + describe("internal-only hostname suffixes", () => { + it.each([ + "http://printer.local/x.png", + "http://app.localhost/x.png", + "http://svc.internal/x.png", + "http://box.lan/x.png", + "http://thing.home.arpa/x.png", + ])("rejects %s", (src) => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc(src)).toBe(false); + }); + }); + + describe("legitimate images still render", () => { + it.each([ + "https://images.example.com/photo.png", + "http://cdn.example.org/a/b/c.jpg", + "https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/1/2.png", + "https://example.co.uk/img.webp", + "https://sub.domain.example.com:8443/img.png", + ])("allows %s", (src) => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc(src)).toBe(true); + }); + }); + + describe("empty and malformed input", () => { + it.each(["", " ", "not a url", "http://", "://example.com"])("rejects %j", (src) => { + expect(isSafeImageSrc(src)).toBe(false); + }); + }); +}); + +describe("isBlockedHostLiteral", () => { + it("classifies canonical IPv4 literals", () => { + expect(isBlockedHostLiteral("127.0.0.1")).toBe(true); + expect(isBlockedHostLiteral("10.1.2.3")).toBe(true); + expect(isBlockedHostLiteral("8.8.8.8")).toBe(false); + expect(isBlockedHostLiteral("1.1.1.1")).toBe(false); + }); + + it("classifies IPv6 literals with and without brackets", () => { + expect(isBlockedHostLiteral("::1")).toBe(true); + expect(isBlockedHostLiteral("[::1]")).toBe(true); + expect(isBlockedHostLiteral("2606:4700:4700::1111")).toBe(false); + }); + + it("treats real hostnames as non-literals", () => { + expect(isBlockedHostLiteral("example.com")).toBe(false); + expect(isBlockedHostLiteral("api")).toBe(false); + }); +});